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Abstract: Development theory and practice need a new approach that, more than pointing out 
institutions to be improved, unveils the underlying mechanisms of path dependent processes of 
underdevelopment. This paper presents insights for such approach while making the statement 
that development is not exclusively an issue of interventionism, but rather must be taken from 
the perspective of spontaneous order. The starting point is the idea that development is an 
evolutionary process of trials, errors, learning and adaptation. The keystone is the concept of 
learning as a process of adaptive reorganization that links the microgenesis of capabilities and 
institutions to the production of social goods. The main argument in that adaptive efficiency 
is the product of an evolutionary process in which certain types of learning prevail, locking 
societies in vicious cycles of underdevelopment or unlocking the path to prosperity. When 
individuals and groups learn reflectively, in the sense that they reflect upon not only their 
problem-solving tasks but also upon the assumptions underlying their actions, they are more 
likely to adaptively reorganize capabilities and institutions locally. Without such reflection, 






Resumen: La teoría y la práctica del desarrollo necesitan un nuevo enfoque que, más que señalar 
las instituciones a mejorar, revele los mecanismos subyacentes de los procesos de subdesarrollo 
dependientes de la trayectoria. Este documento presenta ideas para dicho enfoque al mismo 
tiempo que afirma que el desarrollo no es exclusivamente un problema de intervencionismo, 
sino que debe tomarse desde la perspectiva del orden espontáneo. El punto de partida es la 
idea de que el desarrollo es un proceso evolutivo de pruebas, errores, aprendizaje y adaptación. 
La clave es el concepto de aprendizaje como un proceso de reorganización adaptativa, que 
vincula la microgénesis de capacidades e instituciones a la producción de bienes sociales. El 
principal argumento en el sentido de que la eficiencia adaptativa es el producto de un proceso 
evolutivo en el que prevalecen ciertos tipos de aprendizaje, lo que encierra a las sociedades en 
ciclos viciosos de subdesarrollo o abre el camino hacia la prosperidad. Cuando los individuos 
y los grupos aprenden de manera reflexiva, en el sentido de que reflexionan no solo en sus 
tareas de resolución de problemas sino también en los supuestos que subyacen en sus acciones, 
son más propensos a reorganizar las capacidades e instituciones de manera adaptativa a nivel 






Resumo:  Teoria e prática do desenvolvimento precisam de um novo enfoque que, além de 
sinalizar as instituições a serem melhoradas, revele os mecanismos subjacentes dos processos de 
desenvolvimento dependentes da trajetória. Este documento apresenta ideias para esse enfoque, 
enquanto afirma que o desenvolvimento não é exclusivamente um problema de intervencionismo, 
mas que deve ser analisado pela perspectiva da ordem espontânea. O ponto de partida é a 
ideia de que o desenvolvimento é um processo evolutivo de provas, erros, aprendizagem e 
adaptação. O ponto central é o conceito de aprendizagem como processo de reorganização 
adaptativa, que vincula a microgênese de capacidades e instituições à produção de bens sociais. 
O argumento principal é que a eficiência adaptativa é o produto de um processo evolutivo 
em que prevalecem certos tipos de aprendizagem que, ou condenam as sociedades a ciclos 
viciosos de subdesenvolvimento, ou pavimentam seu caminho para a prosperidade. Quando 
indivíduos e grupos aprendem de forma reflexiva, no sentido de que refletem não apenas sobre 
suas tarefas de resolução de problemas, mas também sobre as suposições que subjazem suas 
ações, ficam mais propensos a reorganizar capacidades e instituições de forma adaptativa a 
nível local. Sem tal reflexão, mantêm-se presos a padrões irreflexivos de subdesenvolvimento.
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Introduction
Great efforts have been made by governments, multilateral organizations, development 
banks, as well as by all kinds of public and private agents, including the academy, in order to 
understand and implement solutions to drive less developed societies to prosperity. Prescribed 
responses in mainstream development theory and public policy are mostly based on incentives 
and constraints that might produce better choices, usually aiming at some sort of institutional 
improvement, but when these initiatives fail there is not so much left in the manuals. The 
persistence of poverty in all continents is the unfortunate evidence that such efforts have 
been seldom successful. Development theory and practice need a new approach that, more 
than pointing out institutions to be improved, unveils the underlying mechanisms of path 
dependent processes of underdevelopment. This paper presents insights for such approach 
while making the statement that development is not exclusively an issue of interventionism, 
but rather must be taken from the perspective of spontaneous order.
The starting point is the idea that development is an evolutionary process of trials, errors, 
learning and adaptation, as Hayek (1960) suggests. The keystone is the concept of learning as 
a process of adaptive reorganization, a definition proposed by Hutchins (1995), which links 
the microgenesis of capabilities and institutions to the production of social goods. The main 
argument in that adaptive efficiency is the product of an evolutionary process in which certain 
types of learning prevail, locking societies in vicious cycles of underdevelopment or unlocking 
the path to prosperity. When individuals and groups learn reflectively, in the sense that they 
reflect upon not only their problem-solving tasks but also about the assumptions underlying 
their actions, they are more likely to adaptively reorganize capabilities and institutions locally. 
Without such reflection, they keep locked in unreflective patterns of underdevelopment. In this 
sense, society evolves according to the dispute between reflective and unreflective learning 
types, an evolutionary process beyond central planning and design, in which intentionality, 
reflection and adaptation occur mostly locally.
This essay intends to contribute to the process of building a new perspective to development 
theories and practices. An approach centered on learning processes that go beyond the human 
mind and intentionality may be the key for understanding the dynamics of development 
in terms of how capabilities and institutions evolve and, moreover, may produce practical 
implications for public policies. Rather than the usual responses of institutional incentives, 
this approach inquires how individuals, organizations and societies deal with changing 
circumstances and learn from trials and errors over time. The identification and study of 
patterns that block such learning processes may be a relevant step for the development of 
new solutions towards the path of prosperity.
1. Development and Learning
The search for the primary causes of economic growth and development produced 
convincing theories and empirical evidences for several possible explanatory variables, such 
as geography and natural resources (DIAMOND, 1999; SACHS, 2012); human (ROMER, 1986; 
LUCAS, 1988) and social capital (PUTNAM, 1993), institutions (NORTH, 1990; MACFARLAN; 
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EDISON; SPATAFORA, 2003; ACEMOGLU; JOHNSON; ROBBINSON, 2004), and so on, an 
inquiry that has been always pervaded by a passionate debate about the role of the state. The 
Cold War was the background of a dispute between the principles of the free market and 
the developmental state in Economics that was reopened for Politics and other fields when 
institutions became the mainstream’s explanatory variable. Neoclassical economics expanded 
to New Institutional Economics (NIE) relaxing assumptions about perfect information and 
utility maximization, while the developmental state embraced institutions as fundamental 
variables in approaches such as the Varieties of Capitalism. 
Institutions are now central not only in development theory, but also in public policy 
practice, as seen in projects managed by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, 
the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. There is a settled belief that well 
designed institutions are able to provide incentives that will guide different societies to 
prosperity, even with the evidence of the contrary exposed by the challenges faced by state 
building and local development projects in poor nations.
While recent research in Social Sciences seems mostly focused on how incentives and 
constraints shape human behaviour, there is an implicit and yet unexplored role for adaptive 
learning that may complement the approaches that explain how institutions embed agency. 
More than the static influence of the “rules of the game” driving decisions, one should try 
to grasp the dynamics of the process of learning, decision after decision, which consolidates 
experiences into capabilities, institutions and practices. It is in this sense that this article looks 
at learning as the microgenesis of development.
Individuals, organizations and society change as they learn in the face of ongoing new 
challenges. The ability to adjust to such dynamic change, what North (2005) called “adaptive 
efficiency”, was first pointed out by Hayek (1945) as the “economic problem of society” and later 
(HAYEK, 1960) developed to the idea of progress as a “process of adaptation and learning”. 
As a matter of fact, the concept of development as a learning process has its foundations in 
the early days of Political Economy. Adam Smith’s invisible hand was taken by a positivist 
economic theory to explain market equilibrium, but this metaphor is part of a broader tradition, 
as pointed out by Hayek (1960), that understands the power of spontaneous order in all human 
endeavors as a process of continuous imitation, trial, error and learning from experience, from 
which new institutions and practices emerge. Hayek states that one should “think of progress 
as a process of formation and modification of the human intellect, a process of adaptation 
and learning in which not only the possibilities known to us but also our values and desires 
continually change” (HAYEK, 1960, p. 37).
Hayek adds to this tradition an insight about the use of knowledge in society that make 
experimentation the social learning mechanism par excellence. Hayek (1948) states that as the 
main problems of society are related to rapid adaptation to changes in particular circumstances, 
one should leave the decisions to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, 
maximizing the chances that knowledge will be properly used. Based on the idea of adaptation 
in face of complexity, this is a strong argument in favor of decentralization and spontaneous 
order not only for market relations, but also for institutional and cultural change. He points 
out that the problem of the use of knowledge, which is not given to anyone in its totality, 
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“is by no means peculiar to economics”, but rather “constitutes really the central theoretical 
problem of all social science” (HAYEK, 1948, p. 88).
Notice that the process of evolution in focus is not the mechanism of “natural selection” in 
which individuals and organizations compete to “survive”, but rather the learning processes 
that generate capabilities and institutions that will support these individuals and organizations 
in the adventure of building prosperous societies. It is the fitness of a superior learning type 
that matters here. The issue is neither just about stocks of knowledge operating as sources of 
path dependence of one technology over the other, nor stocks of human capital that increase 
productivity and produce growth. The subject is the dynamics of learning processes that 
produce such stocks and, moreover, the fitness of types of learning in certain environments 
and how they produce or slow down development.
Hayek also proposes an epistemology of complexity to this evolutionary approach. Milton 
Friedman (1966) was very influential in this matter, arguing that there is a normative agreement 
on economic prosperity, but researchers still have to find consensus about the most adequate 
economic policies to achieve such “ought to be”, a task to be engaged by Economics as a 
positive science. Moreover, he states that hypotheses should be confirmed by the comparison 
of predictions with experience, in order to build a “body of tentatively accepted generalizations 
about economic phenomena”. These methodological claims justified empirical assumptions, 
hypotheses and models designed in the manner of the Natural Sciences, while theories became 
validated by their problem-solving effectiveness. Curiously enough, although sharing political 
preferences with Friedman, Hayek presents a distinct epistemological position in his “Theory 
of Complex Phenomena”. He argues (HAYEK, 1967) that for complex phenomena, such as those 
studied by Social Sciences, the conception of “law” in the cause and effect sense of Natural 
Sciences is inappropriate. Such phenomena must be studied and explained as patterns that 
emerge from the relations between the elements of a system, rather than by individual events. 
He explains that economic theory must describe patterns observed under certain circumstances 
and “rarely if ever derive from this knowledge any predictions of specific phenomena”.
Hayek’s epistemology encourages the adoption of development as a learning process to 
be studied by its composite processes rather than by explanatory variables in unidirectional 
causality. Instead of the primary causes development studies have been looking for, one 
should try to grasp the patterns of development as processes of fortune taming, of adapting 
in the face of changes and achieving goals through a decentralized learning process of trial 
and error. Rather than a state to be reached, development may be the process of learning by 
which human organizations get ready to act when opportunities arise from the continuously 
changing environment. Hayek’s perspective goes beyond the limits of the intentionality of 
private and public agents, including social and cultural traits that are not necessarily products 
of human design. Rather than a theory of choice under uncertainty in which incentives and 
constraints are the focus of analysis, one may need to start studying learning processes and 
patterns, in order to approach the political economy of prosperity with a theory of social 
change. In this sense, development is an evolutionary process of adaptive learning.
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2. Adaptive Efficiency and Learning
Mantzavinos, North and Shariq (2004, p. 76) define learning as the “complex modification 
of mental models according to the feedback received from the environment”. Environmental 
feedbacks can reinforce mental models, consolidating beliefs, or lead to their creative modification. 
The authors explain that in the societal level learning occurs collectively, modifying shared 
mental models and producing belief systems that will support institutions, policies and, 
ultimately, economic performance. Since the mind interprets reality in on the basis of shared 
mental models of , path dependence in economic growth can be traced from the cognitive level.
While this “cognitive approach” allows learning processes to connect very distinct levels 
of the political economy of development, from individual cognition to economic prosperity, it 
seems the evolutionary explanation of the emergence of institutions presented in the article 
is still more a functionalist process of selection than an adaptive process of learning. The 
authors explain the rise of the state as a solution for the problems of trust and protection from 
aggression. When a society grows bigger and relationships become increasingly impersonal, 
“individuals capable of learning are bound to realize” that the probability of dealing with 
defectors increases. This collective lesson implies a demand for protection that will be provided 
by many protective agencies, because of the higher transaction costs of the formation of coalitions 
for each time defection occurs. With access to violence mechanisms with nothing else than 
informal rules to constrain them, the protective agencies engage in a trial and error process 
of competition and cooperation, “from armed battles to complete fusions”, in order to keep 
control. They conclude that this evolutionary process generates governmental organizations 
taxing constituents for protection.
The evolutionary process in the selection of agencies is clear, but when learning takes 
place adaptive efficiency is taken as given: individuals realize the increase of defections and 
higher transaction costs of certain solutions to make choices. The authors cautiously address the 
point that from an evolutionary perspective this story is just one of many possible outcomes, 
but while history takes the path of the emergence of the state because of settled relative costs, 
learning is still implicit in a model of incentives and constraints.
Transaction costs are, in short, the costs of ambiguity. Imperfect information, unclear 
rights and inefficient enforcement produce ambiguities that will be objects of bargaining all 
the way to the courts. Such ambiguities can be reduced by contracts in the free market or by 
social rearrangements that absorb these transactions in administrative decisions and norms, 
such as firms (COASE, 1937) or governmental regulations (COASE, 1960). The static way to 
explain the emergence of the state from an institutional perspective is that cost and benefit 
analysis weighed by transaction costs led choices to “agencies” and then to governments. 
The complementary dynamic explanation might be that ambiguities continuously blocked 
reflections about adaptive rearrangements in the market, driving history to a reinforcement 
cycle of power concentration. Perhaps more than the level of uncertainty for political and 
economic choices, transaction costs influence the kind of learning that prevails. 
North (2005) himself admits that while his initial studies placed institutions in the 
center of economics as incentive structures, they disregarded “the way humans understand 
and act upon” societal change. He takes a step outside the individual boundaries of mental 
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models with Hutchins and Hazlehurst’s (2003) concept of “artifactual structure”. He points 
out that what is learned by one generation is transmitted to the other by artifactual structures 
of beliefs, knowledge, institutions, tools, technology and so on. Such structures shape the 
“immediate choices of players” as well as provide clues to the dynamics of “success or failure 
of societies through time”. He explains that the richer the artifactual structure, the greater is 
the reduction of uncertainty in making choices and the wider is the range of possibilities of 
experimentation and creative competition. “The richer the artifactual structure, the more likely 
are we to confront novel problems successfully. That is what is meant by adaptive efficiency” 
(NORTH, 2005, p. 70).
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) advance in the study of adaptive efficiency as an 
essential force of long-run stability of developed societies fostered by competition and credible 
commitments. They explain that open access to organizations and the free flow of ideas enhance 
the ability of individuals to pursue their interests and find better solutions for new problems, in 
a Schumpeterian process of political and economic creative destruction. Conflicts related to this 
competition of ideas do not generate disorder because commitments established by institutions 
are credible and impersonal in the so-called “open access” social order. On the other hand, 
in “natural states” privileged groups control valuable resources and activities constraining 
the ability of individuals to explore new opportunities and solutions. Competition is limited 
and institutions are unable to create credible commitments in the economy and the polity.
Like in North (2005) and in Mantzavinos, North and Shariq (2004), in North, Wallis and 
Weingast (2009), adaptive efficiency is characterized as a process of competition that selects 
solutions framed by a set of institutions that produce better choices. These insightful works 
advance in the concept of development as an evolutionary process and provide ideas for a 
grounded concept of learning in this context. One can picture a process in which mental 
models modify, artifactual structures evolve, new solutions are continuously tested and mental 
models change again. However, in order to figure out how to improve adaptive efficiency 
to produce prosperity one should observe not only the selection of solutions, but also how 
they are produced. Rather than between solutions, the competition is between the learning 
processes that produce such solutions to never-ending new arising challenges. It seems the 
study of development in terms of adaptive efficiency is beyond mental models, frames for 
choices and arenas of experimentation of ideas and solutions. Hutchins takes this step further 
by understanding artifactual structures and mental models as media of the learning process 
in distributed cognition.
3. Adaptive Learning
Hutchins (1995) is an important reference to this paper because his approach of distributed 
cognition brings together learning and complexity in a concrete and observable manner. 
Hutchins rejects the idea of culture as a “collection of things” and, in the manner of Hayek, 
proposes that culture is an adaptive process that accumulates partial solutions while our 
everyday practices are enacted. He explains that as a consequence of each task performance 
and its repetition over time individuals reorganize their minds to develop skills, while partial 
solutions are crystallized in material artifacts and in the social organization of the work. He 
Gabriel Braga Filartiga
7 de 12 | MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, São Paulo, 2019; 7(2) Maio-Ago
understands stocks of knowledge as well as logbooks and pencil marks on charts as residua 
of this process, observing the microgenesis of cultural elements in the details of the ongoing 
practice.
In his research, Hutchins describes navigation tasks performed by a team at the bridge 
of a Navy ship as a process of propagation and transformation of representations distributed 
across members of the group, through time and beyond the “skin or skull” of an individual. 
He believes the real power of human cognition is the ability of bringing bits of structure 
into coordination in order to organize solutions, defining learning as a process of “adaptive 
reorganization in a complex system” (HUTCHINS, 1995, p. 289). He explains that in the 
task of “fixing” the position of the ship a “wave of organization” propagates through time 
and space from external media, such as written procedures and navigation instruments, to 
internal media, such as individual minds that coordinate words and meanings, and back to 
external media, such as the map where the position is marked. Cognition is distributed in 
the sense that cognitive processes related to memory, reasoning and learning are not closed 
within the boundary of individual minds, but can also be observed in the social and material 
world, coordinating minds and material artifacts. Learning is a cognitive process of adaptive 
reorganization of parts of a system in relation to other parts.
Hutchins states that the conduct of the activity, the development of the practitioners and 
the evolution of the practice are all the same process, explaining that its products go beyond 
the end of the task as new ways of solving problems written down in improved procedures or 
remembered as memories, habits and skills. A learned lesson shapes the immediate performance 
and the future career of a military officer, rewrites the formal process of a task in manuals that 
will be used by different crews, and may change patterns of behavior and social organization 
that affect the whole corporation. In this sense, Hutchins’ concept of learning has the plasticity 
of a wave of adaptive organization that propagates in all dimensions connecting subsystems, 
that can be seen as individuals, teams or sub-processes, in various levels and time scales. 
The study of distributed cognition throughout the web of connected subsystems is in the 
domain of Hayek’s epistemology of complexity and provides evidences of his hypothesis of 
decentralized adaptive learning. When the ship’s propulsion system failed during an entry 
into San Diego Harbor, Hutchins observed two modes of adaptive responses to the problem 
of fixing their position without the support of crucial electrical devices. The first was an 
unreflective process of adaptive interactions among subsystems in which the calculation of the 
position of the ship was made differently depending just on the availability of data, without 
further reflection upon neither the local nor the overall process. The second was the case of 
local design, in which one person was aware that was falling behind and implemented a local 
change in the calculation process that in sequence triggered both unreflective and locally 
designed adaptive responses in other subsystems. Hence, the ship is a complex system of 
processes and mediating artifacts in which organization is achieved by adaptations to emerging 
circumstances. Learning is this process of adaptive reorganization in which representations 
of reality change in mental models and material artifacts. Hutchins points out that systems 
change in part by an evolutionary process and in part by design. Even when subsystems 
change by local design, adaptation in the system level is evolutionary in the sense that many 
other subsystems may present unreflective responses to such change. With an anthropological 
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approach, he doesn’t make judgments about which learning type is desirable, but rather realizes 
that solutions “we recognize in retrospect as being just the sort of solution we would hope 
designers could produce” are a “product of adaptation rather than of design” (HUTCHINS, 
1995, p. 317).
Hutchins’ concept is powerful for many reasons. First, the learning process that builds 
artifactual structures is explicit from the very beginning as a wave of organization connected 
to the microgenesis of capabilities and institutions. In this sense, it has the flexibility to 
navigate in various levels and time scales, from individual skills to cultural elements. Second, 
the identification of reflective and unreflective learning types and their combination in 
evolutionary processes may help us explain unintended and even counterintuitive patterns 
in social systems, including in the political economy of development. Third, the proposition 
that cognition is distributed has interesting empirical implications. It encourages not only 
ethnographic approaches, as adopted by Hutchins with recording and observations in loco, 
but may also inspire the researcher to see collected data as residua of learning waves through 
time. In order to identify what types of learning are at play, one can analyze data not just from 
“internal media” by interviews, surveys or experiments, but also from “external media” such 
as databases, reports and archives.
Hutchins’ perspective is by no means limited to his ship’s problems. One can imagine 
learning as the rearrangement of processes within firms deciding to contract or expand 
activities in order to reduce transaction costs, or as the improvement of institutions to coordinate 
relations between labor and business in varieties of capitalism, or yet as the reengineering 
of “routines” in innovation processes of evolving technologies. I see learning as the adaptive 
reorganization of capabilities and institutions in the pursuit of prosperity. These processes of 
change can be unreflective, reflectively designed or evolutionary combinations of both. While 
in the level of the system the challenges are always changing and never completely known, 
Hutchins offers an approach that traces learning from the level of local design in subsystems.
4. Adaptive Development and the Production of Social Goods
The main idea of this essay is that development is an evolutionary process of adaptive 
learning, in which a competition between more or less reflective learning types take place. 
One of the most important differences between traditional and evolutionary games is that the 
latter relaxes the assumption of rationality. So, I invite the reader to avoid the temptation of 
thinking of the encounter between learning types as a moment of calculated choice. Individual 
minds are only part of the learning process, only media through which learning waves pass 
by. Learning may be reflective, but its prevalence after each encounter with other types is not 
a product of rationality whatsoever. It is a process of adaptation in which distinct types of 
reorganization may occur depending on how ambiguous and defensive the system is. Since 
we seldom realize these barriers to learning, we may reflect about the problems we solve, but 
not quite about the learning type we follow. 
Gabriel Braga Filartiga
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Consider the production of social goods1 by the government in a process in which subnational 
entities such as states make investments with credit contracts from a development bank. In 
order to access each planned disbursement the states need to accomplish some requirements, 
such as those regarding environmental licensing and the correct expenditures report of the 
previous tranche. Of course, some states will be more successful than others, providing 
solutions for the requirements, managing their projects and delivering their contribution 
to local development. For those that fail to access the resources, the usual responses of the 
creditors are financial covenants in contracts with incentives or sanctions. This is an example 
in the micro level of the solutions prescribed by development theories that take institutions 
as explanatory variables. On the other hand, a learning approach would ask, first, how are 
the states dealing with their mistakes? Are they keeping the same pending requirements or 
anticipating future solutions? 
Consider now one state that, locked in the unreflective learning type, couldn’t build 
a school on time because of recurrent pending environmental requirements, and another 
state that after experiencing the same problem for a while created an online application and 
reengineered the permitting processes. If both started with the same incentives in terms of 
the expected payoffs, contracts and regulation, the question is why did one reflectively solve 
the problem, while the other didn’t? One quick answer would be about levels of development, 
with the unsuccessful state falling behind in education, economic performance, institutional 
effectiveness and so on. While this answer would describe the status of the problem it wouldn’t 
explain the inability of the state to change. It would describe the stocks of the artifactual 
structure without the flows that change them. What would be the dynamic explanation in 
terms of adaptive efficiency? Which impediments to adaptively reorganize in order to carry 
on their projects did the unsuccessful state face? 
New Institutional Economics introduced the adaptive feature of the market into the 
organizations as strategic choices between aggregating and disaggregating activities, depending 
on the costs of transaction. Williamson (1991) summarizes this idea contrasting Hayek’s 
spontaneous order of market relations to the purposeful cooperation of formally organized 
hierarchies. He argues that hierarchies replace market incentives, which are typically driven 
by relative prices, with administrative controls; and substitutes formal contract law for internal 
relations in which “hierarchy is its own court of ultimate appeal” (WILLIAMSON, 1991, p. 274). 
He explains that the craft of internal coordinating mechanisms supplants the “autonomous” 
adaptation of the free market when authority relations have adaptive advantages over autonomy.
One hypothesis to be empirically studied is that hierarchical organizations, in opposition 
to and without real adaptive advantages over market-based organizations, create defensiveness 
and ambiguity as barriers to reflective learning. The following are two real examples that 
illustrate this idea, selected from a broader research on water and sanitation projects in Brazil.
With the best of the intentions, one state decided to have the signature of the accountability 
office before sending each of the expenditures reports to the development bank, a process 
of compliance that usually takes place afterwards. The timing of compliance and project 
1 In the sense that they are not strictly public goods, but rather any project considered meritorious to be part of 
a public program of investment, such as water & sanitation, hospitals, schools, roads, etc.
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management were quite different and frequently engineers had the feedback from the office 
too late to make adjustments, making the new process strictly bureaucratic. The new procedure 
also created ambiguities and, apprehensive with the kind of control they would be exposed 
to, engineers and bureaucrats became more and more defensive, providing the minimum 
information and avoiding any kind of creative solution for the project. Because of misperceptions 
of timing and defensiveness, the reporting process of each tranche was extended for weeks 
with marginal quality improvement and all projects were rescheduled several times. Instead of 
developing for a prosper mix of project management capabilities, creative institutional change 
and entrepreneurial practices, the state reinforced this vicious cycle for a long time. In this 
first example, a good intention enacted in one subsystem generated adaptive reorganizations 
in other parts of the system that locked the system in a path of low performance.
The second real example is a R$ 1 billion program of investments that takes place in 
nine municipalities, with a 1,000 km sewer network, seven treatment facilities, 100 pumping 
stations and other items. The agent is a publicly traded company, with good credit rating, 
access to international capital markets and diversified funding instruments, including loans 
and debentures. Given the size of the investment, technical complexity and the bureaucracy 
the project went through, it was remarkably successful. Analysts and project managers were 
able to anticipate the risks of delay, budget shortage and regulatory uncertainties about the 
agreements between the agent and the municipalities in which facilities would be constructed.
One of the critical factors of this project was the number of environmental processes 
that would have to be managed, so the agent worked to obtain such documents right away. 
Moreover, the agent was reportedly able to contribute for the improvement of the environmental 
authority within the state bureaucracy, supporting the creation of a fast track licensing process 
for projects with low or positive environmental impacts, such as sewage facilities. This is 
the learning wave in motion: from the desk of the analyst a reflective solution propagates 
throughout the minds and documents of various groups involved with the project, reaching 
a meeting room in the environmental department where managers discuss and adaptively 
reorganize the procedures that simplify authorizations for sewage projects. In this case, there 
was an adaptation to improve the “rules of the game”, resulting in better conditions not only 
for the project, but also for the production of all kinds of social goods.
Summing up, in these examples project teams organized and reorganized solutions 
attempting to comply with the requirements that would open access to funding for their 
planned investments. Beyond individuals and organizations, reflective and unreflective 
learning took place in this process of adaptation gaining and losing shares as time goes by 
in waves of reorganization spreading throughout the system. In the first example, ambiguity 
and defensiveness blocked learning, project teams were unable to comply with the bank’s 
requirements and the population ended up without the social goods. In the second example, 
a local reflection transformed the institutions, improving the licensing process for all future 
projects. Where the reflective learning type prevailed, development in the form of social 
goods was delivered. 
The next step of this research is the empirical study of the dynamics of shares of learning 
types changing through time. By studying such dynamics with the support of Evolutionary 
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Game Theory, I expect to find the underlying patterns of path dependence to reflective or 
unreflective learning types.
Conclusion
Development is a learning wave. There is nothing metaphorical in the idea of the 
microgenesis of development as a wave of adaptive learning. More than an appealing image 
of development propagating in every direction and through time, the dynamics of adaptive 
learning is a real process with material and non-material consequences. Depending on the 
type of learning that prevails, artifactual structures evolve and barriers to learning strengthen 
or weaken. When they grow, strong barriers lock individuals, organizations and societies in 
vicious cycles of unreflective learning. This work is an attempt to understand and unlock such 
patterns towards the path to prosperity.
In order to do so, I suggested an evolutionary approach that takes development by its 
composite systemic processes rather than by explanatory variables in unidirectional causality. 
Understanding development as a process of fortune taming by decentralized adaptive learning, 
I argued that society should be taken as a learning system in which capabilities and institutions 
co-evolve. In this context, I looked at Distributed Cognition (HUTCHINS, 1995) as a perspective 
to complex systems that allows a drill down to the microgenesis of development in the learning 
process of adaptive reorganization, arguing that capabilities and institutions are products of 
reflective and unreflective learning types that combine in evolutionary processes. Learning is 
adaptive reorganization in the process of trials and errors; and development is an evolutionary 
process in which more or less reflective learning types gain or lose shares over time. 
Systems and their subsystems deal with errors differently, learning reflectively, unreflectively 
or maybe not learning at all. Learning is unreflective when adaptive reorganization occurs 
without reflection about the underlying structure of the problem. On the other hand, learning 
is reflective when adaptive reorganization designs solutions that challenge the structure 
of the problem. These learning types combine in evolutionary processes that may produce 
unintended and counterintuitive consequences such as unfavorable path-dependent patterns 
in less developed societies. Organizations Theory adds to this approach some insights for 
investigating these dynamics through the impediments to learning. The literature discussed 
in this essay is only preliminary on this matter, but provides the interesting starting point of 
the empirical question about how learning types are affected by barriers such as ambiguity 
and defensiveness.
Based on the ancient idea of institutional evolution that, according to Hayek, was borrowed 
from the social sciences by biologists and not the other way around (HAYEK, 1960, p. 53), this 
paper opens a research agenda with learning types in its core and development taken as a 
process of fortune taming and continuous improvement of adaptive efficiency. By understanding 
the dynamics of adaptive development from the perspective of spontaneous order, individuals 
and organizations will learn how to learn and produce reflective solutions that will set them 
free from path-dependent patterns of underdevelopment.
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